From f9323110cea17ccd8265590074ffd7b9a5576976 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andy Dixon Date: Thu, 26 Feb 2026 12:02:21 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] docs: prohibit URL query transport of secrets and tokens Update SDK security guidance to explicitly forbid placing client secrets or bearer tokens in URL query strings, matching provider-side hardening against secret leakage. --- README.md | 1 + docs/INTEGRATION_GUIDE.md | 1 + 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index bdc3d09..e9da455 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ This wrapper now delegates to `BlackWall\Auth\AuthClient`. - Expect `access_denied` even after the consent page is displayed if provider-side project membership or tenant scope changes before consent submission. - Register only HTTPS redirect URIs in provider client settings (HTTP should be used only for localhost loopback during development). - Use OAuth/portal authentication endpoints for end users; provider admin login endpoints enforce separate admin scope checks. +- Never place client secrets, refresh tokens, or access tokens in URL query strings. - For OIDC providers, include a per-request `nonce` in authorisation requests. - Always use HTTPS in production. - Store refresh tokens securely. diff --git a/docs/INTEGRATION_GUIDE.md b/docs/INTEGRATION_GUIDE.md index 4da2bf0..3358f41 100644 --- a/docs/INTEGRATION_GUIDE.md +++ b/docs/INTEGRATION_GUIDE.md @@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ try { - Configure OAuth client redirect URIs as HTTPS in production; reserve HTTP for localhost loopback testing only. - Assume provider rate limits are enforced per source identity (for example IP) and shared across related auth endpoints. - Rotate client secrets for confidential clients. +- Do not transport secrets or tokens in URL query parameters; keep them in server-side session or secure storage only. - Add a unique `nonce` to each OIDC authorisation request. - Validate `state` on every callback request. - Use secure session cookies (`Secure`, `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Lax` or stricter).