Fix review findings: hostile snapshots, stale async results, trash safety
- snapshot: depth limit (stack overflow in exporters), decompressed-size limit (gzip bombs), per-node size cap and saturating aggregation - export: sanitise exclusion patterns from snapshot metadata - tui: drop duplicate/trash/filter results that belong to a replaced tree; cancel duplicate search on rescan - trash: refuse symlinked or foreign shared-filesystem trash dirs; never overwrite an existing trashed item - scan: no symlink following without inode identity; correct unscanned count and keep real read errors after cancellation
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@@ -42,3 +42,23 @@ func TestTrashFreedesktop(t *testing.T) {
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t.Fatal("relative paths must be refused")
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}
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}
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func TestEnsurePrivateDirRejectsSymlink(t *testing.T) {
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base := t.TempDir()
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target := filepath.Join(base, "attacker")
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os.Mkdir(target, 0o700)
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link := filepath.Join(base, ".Trash-1000")
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os.Symlink(target, link)
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if err := ensurePrivateDir(link, false); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("symlinked trash dir accepted")
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}
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open := filepath.Join(base, "open")
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os.Mkdir(open, 0o777)
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os.Chmod(open, 0o777)
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if err := ensurePrivateDir(open, true); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("world-accessible trash dir accepted")
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}
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if err := ensurePrivateDir(filepath.Join(base, "fresh"), true); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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}
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