Fix review findings: hostile snapshots, stale async results, trash safety

- snapshot: depth limit (stack overflow in exporters), decompressed-size
  limit (gzip bombs), per-node size cap and saturating aggregation
- export: sanitise exclusion patterns from snapshot metadata
- tui: drop duplicate/trash/filter results that belong to a replaced
  tree; cancel duplicate search on rescan
- trash: refuse symlinked or foreign shared-filesystem trash dirs; never
  overwrite an existing trashed item
- scan: no symlink following without inode identity; correct unscanned
  count and keep real read errors after cancellation
This commit is contained in:
Andy Dixon
2026-10-02 08:46:52 +01:00
parent 11a0e401ee
commit f4ef12a0dd
10 changed files with 315 additions and 44 deletions
+20
View File
@@ -42,3 +42,23 @@ func TestTrashFreedesktop(t *testing.T) {
t.Fatal("relative paths must be refused")
}
}
func TestEnsurePrivateDirRejectsSymlink(t *testing.T) {
base := t.TempDir()
target := filepath.Join(base, "attacker")
os.Mkdir(target, 0o700)
link := filepath.Join(base, ".Trash-1000")
os.Symlink(target, link)
if err := ensurePrivateDir(link, false); err == nil {
t.Fatal("symlinked trash dir accepted")
}
open := filepath.Join(base, "open")
os.Mkdir(open, 0o777)
os.Chmod(open, 0o777)
if err := ensurePrivateDir(open, true); err == nil {
t.Fatal("world-accessible trash dir accepted")
}
if err := ensurePrivateDir(filepath.Join(base, "fresh"), true); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}