Images sent with the iTerm2 inline protocol (imgcat and friends) are
decoded (PNG, JPEG, GIF first frame) and drawn at the cursor, sized from
the width/height arguments in cells, pixels or percent (aspect kept,
never wider than the terminal); the cursor moves below so text
continues after them. They are anchored to the same stable line index
as the shell-integration marks, scroll with the text and are dropped
with the scrollback or on clear.
Remote data, so decoding is bounded (8192 px a side, 256 MiB
allocation), OSC bodies are capped at 16 MiB, inline=0 downloads are
ignored, and each terminal keeps at most 32 Mpx of images, oldest
first. Sixel and kitty graphics are not implemented.
RDP profiles can go through a Remote Desktop Gateway (MS-TSGU over an
HTTPS WebSocket) with its own username and password, stored like other
credentials (rdp-gateway-password). The gateway stream is bridged to a
loopback socket so the blocking RDP client uses it like any transport.
IronRDP's gateway crate (0.0.1) is vendored with fixes: it used
ironrdp-tls, which accepts any certificate, before sending Basic
credentials — the gateway is now verified against the web PKI; its
asserts on gateway-supplied lengths are errors instead of panics; and
the server port is passed through. Checked against a self-signed
openssl s_server: the connection is refused ('invalid peer certificate')
before any request or credential is sent. Not tested against a real
gateway; Basic-auth gateways only (no NTLM).
- Audio: the RDPSND channel with IronRDP's cpal playback backend (PCM;
Opus left out to avoid another native library). On by default for new
RDP profiles. Building now needs the ALSA headers on Linux
(libasound2-dev), added to CI, release and fuzz jobs and the build docs.
- Shared folder (Linux/macOS): one local folder appears on the remote
desktop as a drive. IronRDP's native backend joins server paths onto
the share unchecked, so it is wrapped in ConfinedDrive: create, list
and rename paths with '..' components, NUL bytes, or that resolve
through a symlink outside the share are refused (ACCESS_DENIED);
tests cover the escapes.
Verified against xrdp (with FUSE): the remote read the shared file, and
writes, mkdir and rename landed in the local folder. Not verified:
audio playback (the test container has no sound module), and xrdp lists
the drive as 'ignored' and can't list its directories (an IronRDP/xrdp
naming and listing mismatch, fixed upstream for the name).
A CLIPRDR channel with a text-only backend (CF_UNICODETEXT): text copied
on the remote desktop is fetched and goes through the app's remote-
clipboard preference like VNC and OSC 52; local text is offered to the
remote when the desktop gains focus, on Ctrl+V and with Paste Clipboard
(which no longer types the text). Backend callbacks run inside the
active stage, so they queue requests that the session loop sends.
Verified against xrdp: the remote X clipboard read back the offered
text, and a remote copy arrived through on_clipboard.
- Credential callbacks (SecretFn) now return Zeroizing<String>, as do the
session-only/pending caches they read and the RDP client's password,
so Nexus's own copies are wiped; a plain String copy is made only
where a library API needs one (SSH password auth, IRC, VNC, CredSSP).
- Release builds disable core dumps (RLIMIT_CORE 0) and, on Linux, mark
the process non-dumpable (PR_SET_DUMPABLE 0), which also blocks ptrace
attach and /proc/<pid>/mem reads by other processes of the same user.
Debug builds are unchanged so they stay debuggable. Verified on the
release binary: core limit 0, /proc/<pid>/{environ,mem} root-owned and
unreadable, local shells (including cwd capture) still work.
Closes the remaining parts of SEC-20261012-007 that the app controls;
egui's internal text buffers remain outside its reach.
The app now writes a diagnostic log to nexus.log in the data directory
(0600, rotated at 5 MiB): connection attempts and results, remote
closes, reconnect scheduling, host-key/certificate checks with the
policy applied, and credentials that couldn't be stored (kind only).
Credentials and terminal data are never logged. RUST_LOG sets the level
and also mirrors the log to stderr. The remaining eprintln! diagnostics
in storage and URL handling go through it too.
clients::rdp connects over any caller-dialled TCP stream (direct, proxy
or SSH tunnel), upgrades to TLS and logs on with NLA (CredSSP/NTLM),
optionally falling back to TLS-only logon for servers without NLA such
as xrdp (credentials are passed so they log straight in). The server
certificate is pinned through a caller check on its SHA256 fingerprint
before any credentials are sent. The desktop decodes into the VNC
client's RGBA framebuffer; input (IronRDP's scancode/Unicode/mouse
operations), Display Control resizes and the deactivation-reactivation
sequence run on the session thread.
IronRDP's releases need three vendored patches (vendor/README.md):
picky and sspi with their RustCrypto release-candidate pins relaxed so
they share russh's stable versions (their own suites, 402 tests, pass
against them), and ironrdp-session with two unreleased upstream bitmap
fixes (#1486 stride, #1524 RDP6 orientation) without which xrdp desktops
render sheared.
Verified live against xrdp (scottyhardy/docker-remote-desktop): logon,
full desktop rendering, keyboard and mouse input.
Session-only credentials (kept for a whole session so reconnects don't
re-prompt), credentials pending until a connection succeeds, and the
credential prompt's text buffer are now Zeroizing and wiped when
dropped, including when a prompt is cancelled or abandoned
(SEC-20261012-007, partial).
Still open: the values handed to the protocol clients are plain Strings
for the duration of authentication, egui keeps its own copies of typed
text, and no mlock/PR_SET_DUMPABLE is applied.
Every shared lock was std::sync::Mutex with lock().unwrap() (~150 sites),
so a panic in any session's reader or callback poisoned the lock and the
next UI frame panicked too, dropping every open session. Locks are now
parking_lot::Mutex (no poisoning; already in the dependency tree), and a
panic hook reports worker panics as an error toast instead of the session
silently stopping (F3, F4).
- Secrets::delete_profile removes every profile credential kind from the OS
keychain as well as the vault (previously only the vault was purged, so
keychain passwords/tokens outlived the profile).
- write_private writes to a sibling temp file and renames it into place, so a
crash mid-write cannot truncate the vault or an export, and a pre-existing
world-readable file is replaced rather than reused.
- Argon2-derived vault/export keys are Zeroizing and wiped on drop.
- Recordings (which capture typed input), JSON exports and --data-dir
directories are created owner-only.
Andy Dixon