- is_web_url sliced the string at byte 7/8, panicking (and killing every
session) when a remote host printed an OSC 8 or plain link with a
multi-byte character at that offset and the user hovered it. It now
compares bytes.
- Paste confirmation also triggers on control characters other than tab
(readline's C-o runs a line with no newline), and the preview shows
them escaped.
- Remote clipboard toasts escape control characters and state the line
count, so 'ls\ncurl … | sh' no longer reads as a harmless 'ls'.
- Inline images: dimensions are read from the header first and anything
over the 32 Mpx per-terminal budget is refused before decoding.
- Toasts: repeats extend the visible toast and at most 8 are kept, so
trigger or OSC 52 floods can't stall frames.
- The URL regex is compiled once.
- Enable eframe's 'links' feature: without it every 'open in browser'
(Cmd/Ctrl+click, GitHub repo links, the update link) was a silent
no-op. Adds webbrowser 1.2.4 to the lockfile.
Bump the workspace to 3.0.1 and bring the user guide up to date: an RDP
chapter, shell integration and inline images, SSH certificates and CAs,
known_hosts import/export, stored credentials and master password change,
profile sync (replacing the Alchementary Link migration chapter), the
Diagnostics tab and log, and refreshed screenshots throughout. The welcome
screen's protocol line now lists RDP.
Images sent with the iTerm2 inline protocol (imgcat and friends) are
decoded (PNG, JPEG, GIF first frame) and drawn at the cursor, sized from
the width/height arguments in cells, pixels or percent (aspect kept,
never wider than the terminal); the cursor moves below so text
continues after them. They are anchored to the same stable line index
as the shell-integration marks, scroll with the text and are dropped
with the scrollback or on clear.
Remote data, so decoding is bounded (8192 px a side, 256 MiB
allocation), OSC bodies are capped at 16 MiB, inline=0 downloads are
ignored, and each terminal keeps at most 32 Mpx of images, oldest
first. Sixel and kitty graphics are not implemented.
RDP profiles can go through a Remote Desktop Gateway (MS-TSGU over an
HTTPS WebSocket) with its own username and password, stored like other
credentials (rdp-gateway-password). The gateway stream is bridged to a
loopback socket so the blocking RDP client uses it like any transport.
IronRDP's gateway crate (0.0.1) is vendored with fixes: it used
ironrdp-tls, which accepts any certificate, before sending Basic
credentials — the gateway is now verified against the web PKI; its
asserts on gateway-supplied lengths are errors instead of panics; and
the server port is passed through. Checked against a self-signed
openssl s_server: the connection is refused ('invalid peer certificate')
before any request or credential is sent. Not tested against a real
gateway; Basic-auth gateways only (no NTLM).
- Audio: the RDPSND channel with IronRDP's cpal playback backend (PCM;
Opus left out to avoid another native library). On by default for new
RDP profiles. Building now needs the ALSA headers on Linux
(libasound2-dev), added to CI, release and fuzz jobs and the build docs.
- Shared folder (Linux/macOS): one local folder appears on the remote
desktop as a drive. IronRDP's native backend joins server paths onto
the share unchecked, so it is wrapped in ConfinedDrive: create, list
and rename paths with '..' components, NUL bytes, or that resolve
through a symlink outside the share are refused (ACCESS_DENIED);
tests cover the escapes.
Verified against xrdp (with FUSE): the remote read the shared file, and
writes, mkdir and rename landed in the local folder. Not verified:
audio playback (the test container has no sound module), and xrdp lists
the drive as 'ignored' and can't list its directories (an IronRDP/xrdp
naming and listing mismatch, fixed upstream for the name).
A CLIPRDR channel with a text-only backend (CF_UNICODETEXT): text copied
on the remote desktop is fetched and goes through the app's remote-
clipboard preference like VNC and OSC 52; local text is offered to the
remote when the desktop gains focus, on Ctrl+V and with Paste Clipboard
(which no longer types the text). Backend callbacks run inside the
active stage, so they queue requests that the session loop sends.
Verified against xrdp: the remote X clipboard read back the offered
text, and a remote copy arrived through on_clipboard.
- Credential callbacks (SecretFn) now return Zeroizing<String>, as do the
session-only/pending caches they read and the RDP client's password,
so Nexus's own copies are wiped; a plain String copy is made only
where a library API needs one (SSH password auth, IRC, VNC, CredSSP).
- Release builds disable core dumps (RLIMIT_CORE 0) and, on Linux, mark
the process non-dumpable (PR_SET_DUMPABLE 0), which also blocks ptrace
attach and /proc/<pid>/mem reads by other processes of the same user.
Debug builds are unchanged so they stay debuggable. Verified on the
release binary: core limit 0, /proc/<pid>/{environ,mem} root-owned and
unreadable, local shells (including cwd capture) still work.
Closes the remaining parts of SEC-20261012-007 that the app controls;
egui's internal text buffers remain outside its reach.
The app now writes a diagnostic log to nexus.log in the data directory
(0600, rotated at 5 MiB): connection attempts and results, remote
closes, reconnect scheduling, host-key/certificate checks with the
policy applied, and credentials that couldn't be stored (kind only).
Credentials and terminal data are never logged. RUST_LOG sets the level
and also mirrors the log to stderr. The remaining eprintln! diagnostics
in storage and URL handling go through it too.
clients::rdp connects over any caller-dialled TCP stream (direct, proxy
or SSH tunnel), upgrades to TLS and logs on with NLA (CredSSP/NTLM),
optionally falling back to TLS-only logon for servers without NLA such
as xrdp (credentials are passed so they log straight in). The server
certificate is pinned through a caller check on its SHA256 fingerprint
before any credentials are sent. The desktop decodes into the VNC
client's RGBA framebuffer; input (IronRDP's scancode/Unicode/mouse
operations), Display Control resizes and the deactivation-reactivation
sequence run on the session thread.
IronRDP's releases need three vendored patches (vendor/README.md):
picky and sspi with their RustCrypto release-candidate pins relaxed so
they share russh's stable versions (their own suites, 402 tests, pass
against them), and ironrdp-session with two unreleased upstream bitmap
fixes (#1486 stride, #1524 RDP6 orientation) without which xrdp desktops
render sheared.
Verified live against xrdp (scottyhardy/docker-remote-desktop): logon,
full desktop rendering, keyboard and mouse input.
Session-only credentials (kept for a whole session so reconnects don't
re-prompt), credentials pending until a connection succeeds, and the
credential prompt's text buffer are now Zeroizing and wiped when
dropped, including when a prompt is cancelled or abandoned
(SEC-20261012-007, partial).
Still open: the values handed to the protocol clients are plain Strings
for the duration of authentication, egui keeps its own copies of typed
text, and no mlock/PR_SET_DUMPABLE is applied.
Every shared lock was std::sync::Mutex with lock().unwrap() (~150 sites),
so a panic in any session's reader or callback poisoned the lock and the
next UI frame panicked too, dropping every open session. Locks are now
parking_lot::Mutex (no poisoning; already in the dependency tree), and a
panic hook reports worker panics as an error toast instead of the session
silently stopping (F3, F4).
- Secrets::delete_profile removes every profile credential kind from the OS
keychain as well as the vault (previously only the vault was purged, so
keychain passwords/tokens outlived the profile).
- write_private writes to a sibling temp file and renames it into place, so a
crash mid-write cannot truncate the vault or an export, and a pre-existing
world-readable file is replaced rather than reused.
- Argon2-derived vault/export keys are Zeroizing and wiped on drop.
- Recordings (which capture typed input), JSON exports and --data-dir
directories are created owner-only.