- LICENSE: the GNU Affero General Public License, version 3 (verbatim
from gnu.org).
- SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only plus a copyright line on every
first-party source file (Rust, shell, Python, PHP); vendored crates keep
their own licenses.
- Cargo manifests carry license/authors/repository; the macOS bundle
copyright and the About page state the license and link the source.
- Release zips (and the macOS app bundle) include LICENSE.
- README: License section.
- Saved credentials are keyed by profile id. A sync peer (or a crafted
import using 'overwrite') could keep an existing profile's id but point
it at another host, user, GitHub API URL, RD Gateway or jump host, and
the saved password/token went there on the next connect without a
prompt. Such a change now forgets that profile's saved credentials
(audited), so the user is asked again.
- --answer / NEXUS_ANSWERS auto-fill every credential prompt and --answer
is visible in the process list; they're now refused unless --screenshot
is given (they exist for screenshot automation).
- Docs: IRC passwords are only sent over TLS/tunnel/loopback; sync's
retarget behaviour; the --answer restriction.
An opt-in integration test tunnels through the test sshd (direct-tcpip)
to a real RDP server and checks that desktop updates arrive — the
route VNC already used, now verified for RDP (against xrdp).
Profiles can be kept in step across machines through any folder they
share (cloud drive, network share, git checkout): one file,
nexus-profiles.nexus, in the encrypted-export format under a sync
password kept in the keychain/vault. Each sync merges profile by profile
(newest updated_at wins), propagates deletions as dated tombstones (an
edit after a deletion brings the profile back; tombstones expire after
180 days), validates every incoming profile, writes the file only when
it changed, and never syncs credentials.
Settings → Security → Profile sync picks the folder and sets the
password; syncs run at launch, 3 s after a profile change, every 10
minutes and on Sync Now (automatic runs stay quiet unless something
changed). An end-to-end test drives create, edit and delete between two
data directories sharing a folder.
- Host certificates: certificate authorities are trusted per OpenSSH host
pattern (stored as @cert-authority known-hosts rows, matched against
'host' or '[host]:port' as OpenSSH does, with *, ? and !). For a host a
CA covers, the client asks for a certificate; one signed by a matching
CA, of host type, naming the host and in date is trusted without a
first-use prompt, and anything else is refused. Hosts no CA covers keep
the existing key checks. Applies to jump hosts and tunnels too.
- User certificates: <key>-cert.pub next to the configured private key is
used for publickey login (falling back to the plain key).
- Settings → Known Hosts: import ~/.ssh/known_hosts (hashed names and
@revoked lines skipped and counted), export in OpenSSH format, and a
Trust a CA form.
Verified against OpenSSH sshd with ssh-keygen-issued certificates: host
cert accepted without prompting and user-cert login with only
TrustedUserCAKeys; a CA for other hosts falls back to the key check; a
different CA is refused.
The Go-generated link.db, profiles.link and rec1.cast fixtures and the
tests that read them are removed. Their coverage is kept by tests on
data this build writes: a fresh database round-trips SSH profiles (env
vars, login scripts, forwards), serial profiles, IRC room state, known
hosts, snippets and preferences, and encrypted exports round-trip and
reject a wrong password. The import dialog no longer offers .link files
and the docs stop mentioning them.
Unlock now always checks the verifier, so an empty vault can never
accept a wrong master password and the 'verify against the first entry'
fallback for Go/older vaults is gone. A vault without a verifier is
refused with a message naming the file to remove (SEC-20261012-016).
The Go vault fixture and its test go with it.
Keychain reads no longer fall back to the AlchementaryLink service and
copy entries forward, and Windows Credential Manager entries use
keyring's own target naming instead of go-keyring's 'service:user'.
Credentials saved by Alchementary Link, or by earlier builds on Windows,
are no longer found and need re-entering.
Every shared lock was std::sync::Mutex with lock().unwrap() (~150 sites),
so a panic in any session's reader or callback poisoned the lock and the
next UI frame panicked too, dropping every open session. Locks are now
parking_lot::Mutex (no poisoning; already in the dependency tree), and a
panic hook reports worker panics as an error toast instead of the session
silently stopping (F3, F4).
Under the 'ask' policy a changed host key used to be a hard error. The
prompt now shows the stored and received fingerprints and offers Reject,
Accept Once (connect, keep the record) and Accept & Update (replace the
record; audited). Unknown keys gain an Accept Once option too. Strict and
accept-new still refuse changed keys without prompting. Known-host rows
written by the old app are confirmed removable by id (test).
The NickServ password (and any other "remember for this session" secret) was
resolved through a fresh per-connect cache, so every auto-reconnect prompted
again with a 60 s timeout and an unanswered prompt failed the reconnect.
Session-only secrets now live on the session, survive auto and explicit
reconnects, and IDENTIFY is sent on every registration as before.
Andy Dixon