Phase 16: hardening and release 0.1.0
- TOTP second factor (RFC 6238, secret encrypted under the master key), ten hashed single-use recovery codes, two-step login with a pending token bound to the client address, account enrolment/disable, admin reset - tests/security: prompt-injection corpus never acts or creates evidence-free beliefs; roles and CSRF on form and API paths; cross-mind isolation (demo scenario 5); stored-XSS escaping and CSP across pages; secrets never echoed (API, pages, database, archives); hostile archive import; session lifecycle and security headers - OpenAPI 3.1 document generated from the route table, served at /api/v1/openapi.json and kept complete by a test - gosec clean (justified #nosec annotations, cookie/redirect hardening, bounded multipart parsing, UUID packing without narrowing conversions); govulncheck clean with toolchain pinned to go1.26.8 - THREAT_MODEL verification pointers, SECURITY.md testing section, README, CHANGELOG 0.1.0, docs/RELEASE_NOTES.md, PLAN status
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## Security testing
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`make security` runs gosec and govulncheck. The test suite includes XSS, CSRF, SQL and command injection, path and archive traversal, webhook signature, prompt injection, cross-mind leakage, capability escalation and session lifecycle tests. See `PLAN.md` phase 16 and `tests/security`.
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- `make security` runs gosec (G104 excluded: unchecked errors are covered by staticcheck and explicit `//nolint:errcheck` markers) and govulncheck. Both are clean as of 0.1.0 with the pinned toolchain in `go.mod`.
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- `go test -race ./tests/security/...` runs the cross-cutting suite: prompt injection through chat and observations (no tool activity, no evidence-free beliefs), role and CSRF enforcement on form and API paths, cross-mind isolation, stored-XSS escaping and CSP on every page, secret non-disclosure (API, pages, database, archives), hostile archive import, session lifecycle and security headers.
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- Package tests cover the SSRF dialer, research-folder and git safety, webhook signatures and replay, capability policy and locked capabilities, TOTP vectors and two-step login.
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- `THREAT_MODEL.md` maps each threat to its mitigation and the test that verifies it.
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## Two-factor authentication
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Operators can enable TOTP (RFC 6238) on the account page. The secret is stored encrypted under `NOEMA_MASTER_KEY`; ten single-use recovery codes are stored hashed and shown once. Login becomes two steps: password, then a code exchanged against a five-minute pending token bound to the client address. Administrators can reset a user's second factor from the users page.
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