Phase 16: hardening and release 0.1.0

- TOTP second factor (RFC 6238, secret encrypted under the master key),
  ten hashed single-use recovery codes, two-step login with a pending token
  bound to the client address, account enrolment/disable, admin reset
- tests/security: prompt-injection corpus never acts or creates evidence-free
  beliefs; roles and CSRF on form and API paths; cross-mind isolation
  (demo scenario 5); stored-XSS escaping and CSP across pages; secrets never
  echoed (API, pages, database, archives); hostile archive import; session
  lifecycle and security headers
- OpenAPI 3.1 document generated from the route table, served at
  /api/v1/openapi.json and kept complete by a test
- gosec clean (justified #nosec annotations, cookie/redirect hardening,
  bounded multipart parsing, UUID packing without narrowing conversions);
  govulncheck clean with toolchain pinned to go1.26.8
- THREAT_MODEL verification pointers, SECURITY.md testing section, README,
  CHANGELOG 0.1.0, docs/RELEASE_NOTES.md, PLAN status

cmd/noemactl/events.go

@@ -66,9 +66,9 @@ func cmdEvent(args []string) int {
 		if base == "" {
 			base = "http://127.0.0.1:8080"
 		}
-		req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", strings.TrimRight(base, "/")+"/api/v1/minds/"+args[1]+"/events/stream", nil)
+		req, _ := http.NewRequest("GET", strings.TrimRight(base, "/")+"/api/v1/minds/"+args[1]+"/events/stream", nil) // #nosec G704 -- NOEMA_URL is the operator\'s own server
 		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+os.Getenv("NOEMA_API_TOKEN"))
-		res, err := (&http.Client{Timeout: 0}).Do(req)
+		res, err := (&http.Client{Timeout: 0}).Do(req) // #nosec G704 -- NOEMA_URL is the operator's own server
 		if err != nil {
 			fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "error:", err)
 			return exitFail