Phase 16: hardening and release 0.1.0

- TOTP second factor (RFC 6238, secret encrypted under the master key),
  ten hashed single-use recovery codes, two-step login with a pending token
  bound to the client address, account enrolment/disable, admin reset
- tests/security: prompt-injection corpus never acts or creates evidence-free
  beliefs; roles and CSRF on form and API paths; cross-mind isolation
  (demo scenario 5); stored-XSS escaping and CSP across pages; secrets never
  echoed (API, pages, database, archives); hostile archive import; session
  lifecycle and security headers
- OpenAPI 3.1 document generated from the route table, served at
  /api/v1/openapi.json and kept complete by a test
- gosec clean (justified #nosec annotations, cookie/redirect hardening,
  bounded multipart parsing, UUID packing without narrowing conversions);
  govulncheck clean with toolchain pinned to go1.26.8
- THREAT_MODEL verification pointers, SECURITY.md testing section, README,
  CHANGELOG 0.1.0, docs/RELEASE_NOTES.md, PLAN status

cmd/noemactl/main.go

@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ func apiRequest(method, path string, body any, out any) (int, error) {
 		b, _ := json.Marshal(body)
 		rd = strings.NewReader(string(b))
 	}
-	req, err := http.NewRequest(method, strings.TrimRight(base, "/")+path, rd)
+	req, err := http.NewRequest(method, strings.TrimRight(base, "/")+path, rd) // #nosec G704 -- NOEMA_URL is the operator\'s own server
 	if err != nil {
 		return 0, err
 	}
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ func apiRequest(method, path string, body any, out any) (int, error) {
 	if body != nil {
 		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
 	}
-	res, err := (&http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second}).Do(req)
+	res, err := (&http.Client{Timeout: 30 * time.Second}).Do(req) // #nosec G704 -- NOEMA_URL is the operator's own server
 	if err != nil {
 		return 0, err
 	}