- Capabilities declare access (read/write, unknown fails closed as
write), side effects, idempotency, timeout, cost estimate and the trust
of their output (web content is low trust). A capability may derive its
policy target from its parameters; a disagreeing target is refused, and
approvals whose modified parameters change the target are refused.
- The registry is frozen at start-up; registration afterwards panics.
- Invocation.RequireApproval turns ALLOW into ASK for commitments; it can
only tighten, and scoped grants never satisfy it.
- Scoped grants (migration 0025): capability, target and parameter globs,
access, expiry of at most seven days and an optional operation count
consumed atomically; applied only where policy says ASK. A sweep marks
lapsed grants and refreshes the self-model, which now lists live grants.
- Capability requests carry scope, duration, operation cap, reason,
evidence, risk, mitigation, fallback, alternatives and explicit decision
history; they batch per intention, are capped per mind (operator
attention budget) and can be decided only by a named person. Component
names are refused as deciders, for approvals too, and as usernames.
- API routes, OpenAPI entries, scheduler sweeps and approval-centre
sections for requests and temporary grants.
- TOTP second factor (RFC 6238, secret encrypted under the master key),
ten hashed single-use recovery codes, two-step login with a pending token
bound to the client address, account enrolment/disable, admin reset
- tests/security: prompt-injection corpus never acts or creates evidence-free
beliefs; roles and CSRF on form and API paths; cross-mind isolation
(demo scenario 5); stored-XSS escaping and CSP across pages; secrets never
echoed (API, pages, database, archives); hostile archive import; session
lifecycle and security headers
- OpenAPI 3.1 document generated from the route table, served at
/api/v1/openapi.json and kept complete by a test
- gosec clean (justified #nosec annotations, cookie/redirect hardening,
bounded multipart parsing, UUID packing without narrowing conversions);
govulncheck clean with toolchain pinned to go1.26.8
- THREAT_MODEL verification pointers, SECURITY.md testing section, README,
CHANGELOG 0.1.0, docs/RELEASE_NOTES.md, PLAN status
Phase 1 foundation. Local auth per ADR-0006: Argon2id passwords, opaque
hashed session tokens with idle/absolute expiry, CSRF token plus Origin
check on cookie sessions, per-IP token bucket and per-account exponential
lockout, three roles enforced by middleware, personal API tokens for
noemactl. Audit log writer used by every admin mutation.
API: request ids, panic recovery, strict CSP and security headers, body
limits, single JSON error envelope, health/ready/status, users, sessions,
tokens, audit, token-protected /metrics.
UI: embedded html/template pages (login, first-run setup, dashboard,
system, users, account, audit, interpretation boundary), light/dark
theme, dependency-free app.js with CSRF-aware fetch and SSE helper.
Binaries: noemad with graceful shutdown, migrations at start, bootstrap
admin from environment, supervised background tasks; noemactl with
status, migrate, user create and meaningful exit codes.
Andy Dixon