- TOTP second factor (RFC 6238, secret encrypted under the master key),
ten hashed single-use recovery codes, two-step login with a pending token
bound to the client address, account enrolment/disable, admin reset
- tests/security: prompt-injection corpus never acts or creates evidence-free
beliefs; roles and CSRF on form and API paths; cross-mind isolation
(demo scenario 5); stored-XSS escaping and CSP across pages; secrets never
echoed (API, pages, database, archives); hostile archive import; session
lifecycle and security headers
- OpenAPI 3.1 document generated from the route table, served at
/api/v1/openapi.json and kept complete by a test
- gosec clean (justified #nosec annotations, cookie/redirect hardening,
bounded multipart parsing, UUID packing without narrowing conversions);
govulncheck clean with toolchain pinned to go1.26.8
- THREAT_MODEL verification pointers, SECURITY.md testing section, README,
CHANGELOG 0.1.0, docs/RELEASE_NOTES.md, PLAN status
- config: defaults -> JSON file -> NOEMA_* env with validation and redaction
- observability: slog with secret-redacting handler; Prometheus registry with
the metric set from the plan (events, workspace, memory, LLM, tools, queues)
- scheduler: supervised Group and bounded Pool so no goroutine is unowned
- storage: pgx pool with statement timeout, embedded migration runner
(advisory lock, checksums, up/down/status), per-test schema helper
- migrations/0001: append-only guard trigger, users, sessions, api tokens,
recovery codes, audit log, settings
- pkg/ids: UUIDv7 with monotonic counter
Andy Dixon