Andy Dixon
a002a2c100
Phase 1 foundation. Local auth per ADR-0006: Argon2id passwords, opaque hashed session tokens with idle/absolute expiry, CSRF token plus Origin check on cookie sessions, per-IP token bucket and per-account exponential lockout, three roles enforced by middleware, personal API tokens for noemactl. Audit log writer used by every admin mutation. API: request ids, panic recovery, strict CSP and security headers, body limits, single JSON error envelope, health/ready/status, users, sessions, tokens, audit, token-protected /metrics. UI: embedded html/template pages (login, first-run setup, dashboard, system, users, account, audit, interpretation boundary), light/dark theme, dependency-free app.js with CSRF-aware fetch and SSE helper. Binaries: noemad with graceful shutdown, migrations at start, bootstrap admin from environment, supervised background tasks; noemactl with status, migrate, user create and meaningful exit codes.
24 lines
578 B
Go
24 lines
578 B
Go
package auth
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import (
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/sha256"
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"encoding/base64"
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)
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// newToken returns a 256-bit random token in URL-safe base64 and its SHA-256,
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// which is what gets stored. A database leak therefore does not leak sessions.
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func newToken() (token string, hash []byte) {
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b := make([]byte, 32)
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if _, err := rand.Read(b); err != nil {
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panic("auth: crypto/rand unavailable: " + err.Error())
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}
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token = base64.RawURLEncoding.EncodeToString(b)
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return token, hashToken(token)
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}
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func hashToken(token string) []byte {
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h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
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return h[:]
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}
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