# vault A post-quantum encrypted file vault in a single binary. Files are encrypted with a hybrid FrodoKEM-640 + ML-KEM-768 key encapsulation and ChaCha20-Poly1305. The vault directory holds only randomly named ciphertexts. Names, sizes, modes and timestamps live inside encrypted catalogue records of one fixed size. File bodies are padded to power-of-two buckets. ## Build ```sh go build . # produces ./vault go test ./... ``` ## Use ```sh vault genkey # create ~/.vault/key, protected by a passphrase vault init # create ~/.vault/store vault add report.pdf # stored as report.pdf vault add report.pdf work/2026 # stored as work/2026/report.pdf vault add ./photos # every regular file under photos/ vault list # everything vault list work # everything under work/ vault get work/2026/report.pdf # writes ./report.pdf vault get report.pdf -o copy.pdf vault mv report.pdf old/report.pdf vault rm old/report.pdf ``` Adding a name that already exists replaces it. `get` refuses to overwrite an existing file and writes nothing until the whole object has authenticated. `--key PATH` and `--vault DIR` work with every command. They default to `$VAULT_KEY` and `$VAULT_DIR`, then to `~/.vault/key` and `~/.vault/store`. The passphrase is read from the terminal, or from `$VAULT_PASSPHRASE` for scripts. ## Decoy passphrase `vault genkey` offers an optional second passphrase. In scripts, set `$VAULT_DECOY_PASSPHRASE`. Each passphrase unlocks its own key, so a command run with the decoy passphrase lists, adds and retrieves only decoy files. The real files never appear. ```sh vault genkey # set a passphrase, then a decoy passphrase vault add plans.pdf # with the real passphrase vault add shopping.txt # with the decoy passphrase vault list # shows only what that passphrase stored ``` Two measures keep the real files deniable: - The key file always holds two slots of identical size in random order. An unused slot is random bytes, so the file does not show whether a decoy exists or which slot is real. - `init` fills every vault with 8 to 32 random entries that nobody can decrypt. Anyone holding only the decoy passphrase sees unreadable entries in every vault, so hidden real files look the same as filler. A decoy can only be set when the key is created. Someone who watches the vault over time can still see it grow when real files are added. ## Limits - One writer at a time. Concurrent writes to the same vault are not locked. - The storage host can see how many files exist, their size buckets and when the vault changes. - The key file is the only way in. Losing it or its passphrase loses the data. ## Licence GPL-3.0-or-later. The cryptographic core is derived from Fury.