28 lines
1.3 KiB
Markdown
28 lines
1.3 KiB
Markdown
# BlackWall Provider Security Model (SDK View)
|
|
|
|
Last reviewed: 2026-02-26
|
|
|
|
This document summarises provider-side security guarantees that SDK integrators should design around.
|
|
|
|
## Threat Assumptions
|
|
|
|
- Provider is internet-exposed.
|
|
- Attackers can register and attempt tenant-boundary abuse.
|
|
- OAuth/WebAuthn endpoints are abuse targets and may rate limit.
|
|
|
|
## Invariants Integrators Should Assume
|
|
|
|
1. Tenant/project/user/client scope is enforced server-side and can change between request steps.
|
|
2. OAuth authorize can fail with `invalid_scope` if requested scopes are not currently allowed for the client.
|
|
3. Token/refresh exchange can fail with `invalid_grant` when subject/client state or scope policy changes.
|
|
4. UserInfo can fail for revoked/invalid/inactive subjects even before nominal token expiry.
|
|
5. Admin and portal workflows are distinct scope domains; do not mix them in client UX flows.
|
|
|
|
## Integration Guidance
|
|
|
|
- Keep requested scopes minimal and aligned to the provider client configuration.
|
|
- Treat `access_denied`, `invalid_scope`, and `invalid_grant` as expected security outcomes, not transport errors.
|
|
- Build retries only for transient failures; do not blindly retry authz/authn denials.
|
|
- Keep enrolment URLs/tokens and OAuth tokens out of URLs, logs, and analytics tags.
|
|
- Use strict HTTPS and secure session-cookie handling in the relying party app.
|