Files
noema/internal/capabilities/capabilities.go
T
Andy Dixon 937c5fb2ff feat(capabilities): metadata, frozen registry, scoped grants and requests
- Capabilities declare access (read/write, unknown fails closed as
  write), side effects, idempotency, timeout, cost estimate and the trust
  of their output (web content is low trust). A capability may derive its
  policy target from its parameters; a disagreeing target is refused, and
  approvals whose modified parameters change the target are refused.
- The registry is frozen at start-up; registration afterwards panics.
- Invocation.RequireApproval turns ALLOW into ASK for commitments; it can
  only tighten, and scoped grants never satisfy it.
- Scoped grants (migration 0025): capability, target and parameter globs,
  access, expiry of at most seven days and an optional operation count
  consumed atomically; applied only where policy says ASK. A sweep marks
  lapsed grants and refreshes the self-model, which now lists live grants.
- Capability requests carry scope, duration, operation cap, reason,
  evidence, risk, mitigation, fallback, alternatives and explicit decision
  history; they batch per intention, are capped per mind (operator
  attention budget) and can be decided only by a named person. Component
  names are refused as deciders, for approvals too, and as usernames.
- API routes, OpenAPI entries, scheduler sweeps and approval-centre
  sections for requests and temporary grants.
2026-09-06 22:29:03 +01:00

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// Package capabilities is the only path from cognition to the outside world
// (ADR-0005, spec §29–30). A capability is registered code with a parameter
// schema and a risk class; a policy engine decides ALLOW / ASK / DENY per
// mind, capability, target and time; ASK creates an approval request bound
// to the exact request; every step is an event.
package capabilities
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/hex"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"path"
"sort"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/andydixon/noema/pkg/events"
"github.com/andydixon/noema/pkg/ids"
)
// Risk classifies the worst plausible consequence of a capability.
type Risk string
// Risk classes.
const (
RiskLow Risk = "low" // read-only, bounded
RiskMedium Risk = "medium" // writes to a sandboxed or reversible place
RiskHigh Risk = "high" // visible external side effects
RiskCritical Risk = "critical" // irreversible or security-relevant
)
// Effect is a policy outcome.
type Effect string
// Effects.
const (
Allow Effect = "allow"
Ask Effect = "ask"
Deny Effect = "deny"
)
// Valid reports whether e is known.
func (e Effect) Valid() bool { return e == Allow || e == Ask || e == Deny }
// Param describes one parameter.
type Param struct {
Type string `json:"type"` // string | int | bool | url | path
Required bool `json:"required"`
Description string `json:"description"`
MaxLen int `json:"max_len,omitempty"`
}
// Access says whether a capability changes anything outside Noema.
type Access string
// Access classes. Unknown access is treated as write (fail closed).
const (
AccessRead Access = "read" // observes; no external state changes
AccessWrite Access = "write" // changes external state
)
// Cost is a capability's expected resource use per invocation, used for plan
// estimates. Zero values mean "negligible", not "unknown".
type Cost struct {
WallSeconds float64 `json:"wall_seconds,omitempty"`
Network int `json:"network_operations,omitempty"`
Money float64 `json:"money,omitempty"`
Tokens int `json:"llm_tokens,omitempty"`
}
// Invocation is a validated request to run a capability.
type Invocation struct {
MindID ids.ID
Capability string
Target string
Params map[string]any
Reason string
Evidence []EvidenceRef
Correlation ids.ID
ApprovalID ids.ID
// RequireApproval turns an ALLOW decision into ASK. Cognition sets it
// when a commitment demands approval; it can only tighten a decision.
RequireApproval bool
// Origin names the cognitive object that asked (for example
// "plan_step:<id>"), recorded with the decision for provenance.
Origin string
}
// EvidenceRef mirrors events.EvidenceRef without importing it (keeps this
// package free of the event store so executors can be tested alone).
type EvidenceRef struct {
Kind string `json:"kind"`
ID string `json:"id"`
Note string `json:"note,omitempty"`
}
// Result is what an executor returns. Output is untrusted data: it becomes an
// observation with tool trust, never an instruction.
type Result struct {
Summary string `json:"summary"`
Output string `json:"output,omitempty"`
Data map[string]any `json:"data,omitempty"`
}
// Executor runs a capability.
type Executor func(ctx context.Context, inv Invocation) (Result, error)
// Capability is a registered tool.
type Capability struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Description string `json:"description"`
Risk Risk `json:"risk"`
TargetKind string `json:"target_kind"` // url | path | host | service | repository | domain | none
Params map[string]Param `json:"params"`
DefaultEffect Effect `json:"default_effect"` // when no policy matches
Locked bool `json:"locked"` // always DENY; cannot be relaxed
Access Access `json:"access"` // read | write
SideEffects string `json:"side_effects"` // what changes in the world when it runs
Idempotent bool `json:"idempotent"` // running it twice has the same effect as once
Timeout time.Duration `json:"timeout"` // executor deadline (default 60s)
Estimate Cost `json:"estimate"`
// TargetFrom derives the policy target from validated parameters (the
// unit a restart acts on, the host of a URL), so a policy or grant on a
// target always matches what the executor will touch. A caller-supplied
// target that disagrees is refused.
TargetFrom func(params map[string]any) (string, error) `json:"-"`
// OutputTrust is the trust given to the observation made from the
// output (default tool). Content fetched from the web is low trust.
OutputTrust events.Trust `json:"output_trust"`
Executor Executor `json:"-"`
}
// Registry holds capabilities. It is built in code at start-up and frozen
// before any mind runs; nothing at runtime can add one, so a mind cannot
// invent tools.
type Registry struct {
caps map[string]Capability
frozen bool
}
// NewRegistry creates an empty registry.
func NewRegistry() *Registry { return &Registry{caps: map[string]Capability{}} }
// Add registers a capability. Adding to a frozen registry is a programming
// error and panics: capabilities are code, never runtime data.
func (r *Registry) Add(c Capability) *Registry {
if r.frozen {
panic("capabilities: registry is frozen; " + c.Name + " cannot be added at runtime")
}
if c.Access != AccessRead {
c.Access = AccessWrite
}
if c.Timeout <= 0 {
c.Timeout = 60 * time.Second
}
if !c.OutputTrust.Valid() {
c.OutputTrust = events.TrustTool
}
if c.Params == nil {
c.Params = map[string]Param{}
}
if !c.DefaultEffect.Valid() {
c.DefaultEffect = Ask
}
if c.Locked {
c.DefaultEffect = Deny
}
r.caps[c.Name] = c
return r
}
// Freeze stops further registration.
func (r *Registry) Freeze() { r.frozen = true }
// Frozen reports whether the registry accepts no more capabilities.
func (r *Registry) Frozen() bool { return r.frozen }
// Get returns a capability.
func (r *Registry) Get(name string) (Capability, bool) {
c, ok := r.caps[name]
return c, ok
}
// List returns capabilities sorted by name.
func (r *Registry) List() []Capability {
out := make([]Capability, 0, len(r.caps))
for _, c := range r.caps {
out = append(out, c)
}
sort.Slice(out, func(i, j int) bool { return out[i].Name < out[j].Name })
return out
}
// ErrInvalid marks bad input; ErrForbiddenContext marks dreaming/replay contexts.
var (
ErrInvalid = errors.New("capabilities: invalid")
ErrForbiddenContext = errors.New("capabilities: actions are not permitted in this context")
ErrUnknown = errors.New("capabilities: unknown capability")
)
// ValidateParams checks and normalises params against the schema. Unknown
// keys are rejected so a model cannot smuggle extra arguments.
func (c Capability) ValidateParams(params map[string]any) (map[string]any, error) {
out := map[string]any{}
for k := range params {
if _, ok := c.Params[k]; !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: unknown parameter %q", ErrInvalid, k)
}
}
for name, p := range c.Params {
v, present := params[name]
if !present {
if p.Required {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: missing parameter %q", ErrInvalid, name)
}
continue
}
switch p.Type {
case "string", "url", "path":
s, ok := v.(string)
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q must be a string", ErrInvalid, name)
}
if p.MaxLen > 0 && len(s) > p.MaxLen {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q too long", ErrInvalid, name)
}
if p.Type == "url" && !(strings.HasPrefix(s, "http://") || strings.HasPrefix(s, "https://")) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q must be an http(s) URL", ErrInvalid, name)
}
if p.Type == "path" && (strings.Contains(s, "..") || strings.ContainsRune(s, 0)) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q contains an unsafe path", ErrInvalid, name)
}
out[name] = s
case "int":
switch n := v.(type) {
case float64:
out[name] = int(n)
case int:
out[name] = n
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q must be an integer", ErrInvalid, name)
}
case "bool":
b, ok := v.(bool)
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: %q must be a boolean", ErrInvalid, name)
}
out[name] = b
default:
out[name] = v
}
}
return out, nil
}
// ResolveTarget applies TargetFrom: it returns the target the request acts
// on, or an error when the caller named a different one.
func (c Capability) ResolveTarget(target string, params map[string]any) (string, error) {
if c.TargetFrom == nil {
return target, nil
}
derived, err := c.TargetFrom(params)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: %v", ErrInvalid, err)
}
if target != "" && !strings.EqualFold(target, derived) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("%w: target %q does not match the parameters (%q)", ErrInvalid, target, derived)
}
return derived, nil
}
// Hash binds an approval to the exact request.
func Hash(mind ids.ID, capability, target string, params map[string]any) string {
raw, _ := json.Marshal(struct {
M ids.ID
C string
T string
P map[string]any
}{mind, capability, target, params})
sum := sha256.Sum256(raw)
return hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])[:32]
}
// ---- policy engine ----
// Policy is one rule.
type Policy struct {
ID ids.ID `json:"id"`
MindID ids.ID `json:"mind_id,omitempty"` // empty = global
Capability string `json:"capability"` // name or *
TargetPattern string `json:"target_pattern"` // glob or *
ActionKind string `json:"action_kind"` // * or a capability-specific action label
Effect Effect `json:"effect"`
HoursFrom *int `json:"hours_from,omitempty"`
HoursTo *int `json:"hours_to,omitempty"`
Reason string `json:"reason"`
CreatedBy string `json:"created_by"`
CreatedAt time.Time `json:"created_at"`
UpdatedAt time.Time `json:"updated_at"`
}
// matches reports whether the policy applies, and its specificity.
func (p Policy) matches(mind ids.ID, capability, target, action string, now time.Time) (bool, int) {
spec := 0
if !p.MindID.IsZero() {
if p.MindID != mind {
return false, 0
}
spec += 8
}
if p.Capability != "*" {
if p.Capability != capability {
return false, 0
}
spec += 4
}
if p.TargetPattern != "*" {
if ok, _ := path.Match(p.TargetPattern, target); !ok && !strings.EqualFold(p.TargetPattern, target) {
return false, 0
}
spec += 2
}
if p.ActionKind != "*" {
if p.ActionKind != action {
return false, 0
}
spec++
}
if p.HoursFrom != nil && p.HoursTo != nil {
h := now.Hour()
from, to := *p.HoursFrom, *p.HoursTo
inWindow := (from <= to && h >= from && h < to) || (from > to && (h >= from || h < to))
if !inWindow {
return false, 0
}
spec++
}
return true, spec
}
// Decision explains a policy outcome.
type Decision struct {
Effect Effect `json:"effect"`
PolicyID ids.ID `json:"policy_id,omitempty"`
GrantID ids.ID `json:"grant_id,omitempty"` // scoped grant that turned ASK into ALLOW
Specificity int `json:"specificity"`
Reason string `json:"reason"`
Locked bool `json:"locked"`
Considered int `json:"considered"`
Tightened bool `json:"tightened,omitempty"` // ALLOW became ASK because the invocation required approval
}
func rank(e Effect) int {
switch e {
case Deny:
return 3
case Ask:
return 2
}
return 1
}
// Evaluate picks the most specific matching policy; on ties the stricter
// effect wins (DENY > ASK > ALLOW). Locked capabilities always deny.
func Evaluate(c Capability, policies []Policy, mind ids.ID, target, action string, now time.Time) Decision {
if c.Locked {
return Decision{Effect: Deny, Reason: "capability is locked to DENY by design", Locked: true}
}
best := Decision{Effect: c.DefaultEffect, Reason: "no matching policy; capability default"}
bestSpec := -1
for _, p := range policies {
ok, spec := p.matches(mind, c.Name, target, action, now)
if !ok {
continue
}
best.Considered++
if spec > bestSpec || (spec == bestSpec && rank(p.Effect) > rank(best.Effect)) {
bestSpec = spec
best.Effect, best.PolicyID, best.Specificity = p.Effect, p.ID, spec
best.Reason = fmt.Sprintf("policy %s (specificity %d): %s", shortID(p.ID), spec, firstNonEmpty(p.Reason, describe(p)))
}
}
return best
}
func describe(p Policy) string {
scope := "global"
if !p.MindID.IsZero() {
scope = "mind"
}
return fmt.Sprintf("%s rule %s on %s target %s", scope, p.Effect, p.Capability, p.TargetPattern)
}
func shortID(id ids.ID) string {
if len(id) >= 8 {
return string(id[:8])
}
return string(id)
}
func firstNonEmpty(a, b string) string {
if a != "" {
return a
}
return b
}
// ---- context guards ----
type ctxKey struct{}
// WithForbidden marks a context (dreaming, replay) in which no capability may
// run. Invoke refuses unconditionally.
func WithForbidden(ctx context.Context, why string) context.Context {
return context.WithValue(ctx, ctxKey{}, why)
}
// Forbidden reports whether actions are refused in ctx.
func Forbidden(ctx context.Context) (string, bool) {
s, ok := ctx.Value(ctxKey{}).(string)
return s, ok
}