docs: prohibit URL query transport of secrets and tokens

Update SDK security guidance to explicitly forbid placing client secrets or bearer tokens in URL query strings, matching provider-side hardening against secret leakage.
2026-02-26 12:02:21 +00:00
parent 12cefe68e8
commit f9323110ce
2 changed files with 2 additions and 0 deletions
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ This wrapper now delegates to `BlackWall\Auth\AuthClient`.
 - Expect `access_denied` even after the consent page is displayed if provider-side project membership or tenant scope changes before consent submission.
 - Register only HTTPS redirect URIs in provider client settings (HTTP should be used only for localhost loopback during development).
 - Use OAuth/portal authentication endpoints for end users; provider admin login endpoints enforce separate admin scope checks.
+- Never place client secrets, refresh tokens, or access tokens in URL query strings.
 - For OIDC providers, include a per-request `nonce` in authorisation requests.
 - Always use HTTPS in production.
 - Store refresh tokens securely.
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ try {
 - Configure OAuth client redirect URIs as HTTPS in production; reserve HTTP for localhost loopback testing only.
 - Assume provider rate limits are enforced per source identity (for example IP) and shared across related auth endpoints.
 - Rotate client secrets for confidential clients.
+- Do not transport secrets or tokens in URL query parameters; keep them in server-side session or secure storage only.
 - Add a unique `nonce` to each OIDC authorisation request.
 - Validate `state` on every callback request.
 - Use secure session cookies (`Secure`, `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Lax` or stricter).